The article by Mandelbrojt on mental images and their pictorial representation [1] is of interest to those who are conscious of a connection between such images and painting. Though the article that I published in the following issue [2] reflects my general position on the question, I feel that I must emphasize certain essential points on which I have reservations.
This question can be studied from three points of view (on them my competence is very unequal): (1) psychological, (2) aesthetic and (3) artistic (pictorial).
(1) Mandelbrojt's article gives a clear analysis, based on his observations. I do not feel qualified to criticize it either from experience or from the reading I have done, e.g. L'imaginaire by J. P. Sartre [3] which impressed me, though I am not in complete agreement with it. I believe that mental images are not always traceable to images of real objects. Rather they are perceived as 'colored interior 0 bjects'.
(2) Mandelbrojt gives us an excellent aesthetic analysis, finding mental images everywhere, a view I shared at one time [4] . More recently I have revised my view [2] . Now for me the basic element in a picture seems to be deeper (in the 'unconscious', which is denied by Sartre) . This element can manifest itself in a mental image, though such an image does not always appear and cannot, therefore, be used as a general criterion. To the three sources of mental images noted by Mandelbrojt-sensation, memory and imagination, should we not add the work itself? The forms and their articulations, flowing one from the other, present a constant challenge to the painter. Would it not be possible when analyzing a picture to arrive at some evaluation of it by considering not only what happens between the painter and the picture but between the picture and the spectator? (3) If the question is, as the title of Mandelbrojt's article states, to represent pictorially mental images, then his preoccupation with 'not adding anything' to the mental image is fully justified. To the painter, 489 the artistic problem in question is quite different from transmitting his mental images accurately. He is making a work of art and his target is far beyond the simple representation of mental images. Something deeper is to be expressed. Mandelbrojt says himself [5] : 'the introduction of scientific truth or accuracy in art is not an aesthetic quality in itself'. I know now, after forty years of practice, that interior vision-I prefer this expression-is just as faithful, even though less accurate and less respected in its integrity than mere representation. The mental image is integrated and subordinated to the art of painting. Of course, if the painting is badly done, the mental image will not save it. There also exist successful pictures in which the artist would not be able to trace or remember any interior vision or definite formal mental image. Justification of these paintings, if they need any, would have to be found in other directions.
The two worlds of interior vision and painting do not completely overlap. It seems to me important to know that interior vision, if the purpose is to make a work of art, is in no way sufficient to guarantee a good result. It is a first-class weapon in the painter's hands but even with it the picture may fail. Some pictures succeed without it. There is more in painting than we now understand.
I agree with many of the points in Michau's interesting letter and I hope to show that they do not contradict what I wrote in my article. There is, however, a fundamental point on which Michau and I clearly disagree. It corresponds to two different (probably equally valid) ways of understanding the significance of art.
Before coming to this, let me first analyse point by point Michau's letter. In the article, 'On Mental Images and Their Pictorial Representation' [1] , I had in mind mainly mental images that could be traced back to real objects. It is true that all mental images are a sign of something deeper than themselves, the subconscious, as Michau emphasizes, but also more generally (and here my point of view differs somewhat from that of the surrealists) the whole internal organization of the artist-his mental organization, his muscular coordination.
I was in agreement with Michau when I wrote in the paragraph called 'Le geste' in 'L'abstrait et Ie reel' [2] : 'In fact, the image represented in a painting is not only a static nor even a dynamic mental image, it is also a muscular image, the painter feels what movements he will have to make to transfer the image onto the canvas, it is only under these conditions that it is an image which can be translated into a painting . . . Sometimes the mental image is bypassed and the painter simply has the muscular image ... . ' Michau also writes 'to sensation, memory and imagination should we not add the work itself [as a source of mental images]'. Again, I agree entirely with him (not so much insofar as my own work is concerned but as a general statement). Many painters, in fact, do not actually start with 'a preconceived idea' (see for instance the article by Jeanne Coppel in the present issue of Leonardo). At the other extreme, for other painters, like myself, there is little, if any, variation of the interior vision in the course of the making of a painting but this vision, of course, depends in part on one's previous paintings.
The artist has, of course, to translate his interior vision into a language which is that of paint. Here Michau and I differ. I intend the translation to be as faithful as possible, which means using all the talent an artist has to find the most suitable language. Let me give an example. There is an old rule, in the best traditional painting, that the parts which are in the light should be painted with thick paint and the shades should be transparent. This could be considered from Michau's point of view as part of 'the art of painting'. I would suggest that it follows naturally, if one wants to be faithful to the kinesthetic aspect of perception, because the eyes simply go over the surface of objects that are in the light, whereas they make an effort to probe the shadows. Now I come to the main point of Michau's letter, which is the relation of the picture to the spectator and the question which is linked to this-why should anyone be interested in the mental images of the painter? Here Michau and I clearly have different points of view. In my opinion, as I explained in the paragraph called 'L'intersubjectivite' in 'L'abstrait et Ie reel' [2] , artists reveal universal human images or behaviour by being faithful to their own most individual interior visions and experiences. An artist discovers those images, which we even recognize in different cultures, such as prehistoric, African or Chinese which are remote from ours (we could call these images 'invariants').
The artist does not try to be original but his way of being universal is by being most true to his own visions or impulses and the spectator should be able to recognize in them his own interior visions, which perhaps he was not aware of before. Beauty and emotion, which are the final criteria of art, do not have to be sought after but result, in my opinion, from the quality of the mental images of an artist and from the adequacy of their expression. The painting should express no less (this requires all the talent of an artist) but no more than the interior vision of an artist, less it loses some of its validity.
Jacques Mandelbrojt Le Bastiden 13-Eguilles, France
ART AND THE SPACE AGE With reference to Malina's 'On the Visual Fine Arts in the Space Age' (Leonardo 3, 323 (1970)), I would like to make the following comments on the subject of seeing stars from the Moon. Reflected sunlight from the lunar surface may but will not necessarily affect the matter. Seeing stars against a dark sky background is best done when the eye is in a state of complete dark adaptation, that is to say, when the observer has been in total darkness for more than 30 to 60 min. During lunar night, under ideal conditions, he should be able to see stars of magnitude 7 (3·89 x 10-10 ft-c), assuming complete dark adaptation and an ambient luminance of 10-6 ft-L.
The whole point is this: If there is any ambient luminance presented to the eye or if there has been any exposure of the eye to luminous flux of sufficient degree and duration to spoil the observer's dark adaptation, then his performance will be penalized. During lunar day and to some extent in lunar night under full-Earth reflected light, any stray light, whether it be from the illuminated lunar surface, from scattering of light by visors, domes or optical devices, or from intraocular scattering of light from some bright source in the field of view, will diminish his ability to see stars. The failure of our astronauts to see stars in daylight is ascribable to one or more of these effects.
So, for an observer to see the fainter stars, he must be thoroughly dark-adapted and be provided with protection from any ambient flux which could affect eye sensitivity. Vitamin A deficiency, of course, will reduce sensitivity but that is unlikely to be a problem until we have slums on the Moon. 
THE BATTLEGROUND OF ART AND SCIENCE (Cont.)
My appraisal of art fashions [1] was in no way meant to suggest that a battleground exists between art and science. In my experience as an artist and as a scientist, science and art constitute a unity [2, 3] . This unity I am trying to form in my paintings and drawings. The emphasis in my article was on art fashions. In this context, I pointed out that the artist's preoccupation with science should not degenerate into engaging him to become merely a supplier of art fashions. It appeared to me to be necessary to stress the artist's relationship to art and science to clarify what, I think, must be the artist's position.
Mandelbrojt [4] makes some comments on this relationship which I dealt with both in my article [5] and in my letter of reply to Hoenich, Gibson and Oster [6] . In my appraisal [1, 6 ] the reader will find that there is no essential variance between Mandelbrojt's views and mine.
Mandelbrojt emphasizes that it is not the medium which counts in making a work of art 'more modern' [4] . Here, the difficulty appears to be that many artists confuse visual gimmicks and the reproduction of experiments in science and technology with new artistic visions. Moreover, I ask, why should it be so important to make works of art 'more modern' and what are the criteria of an increased degree of modernity in a work of art?
The so-called avant-garde, representing what its adherents in the art world consider to be more modern, has become a cult in recent years. I certainly share Edgard Varese's dictum: 'Contrary to general belief, an artist is never ahead of his time but most people are always behind' [7] . I recall him jokingly saying that all talk on the avant-garde in art could just as well have been on the arriere-garde. Recently, Egbert [8] gave in Leonardo an account of the development of the idea of avant-garde in political radicalism and art movements. He cites in his conclusions Cooper [9] , who attacks the avantgardism in today's modern art as a 'folly' that cultivates 'novelty for novelty's sake'. My article on art fashions is meant to be an appeal to artists not to be misguided by any kind of art fashion, including those related to science and technology.
In his reflections on differences between science and art Malina [10] speaks of the estrangement between the arts and the natural sciences, which is now slowly being overcome. I suppose, this refers to those 'consumers of art', a phrase used by Malina, and-I may add-consumers of science, who believe in the existence of such an estrangement. I think that the notion of a battleground between art and science is untenable to one who is aware of the unifying basis underlying both human activities with regard to the creative act, and also to anyone who maintains, as Mandelbrojt puts it, 'that it is at the deepest mental level, the intuitive level, that art and science are truly united'.
One may argue with Mandelbrojt whether or not mathematics constitutes a natural science. I prefer the identification made by the mathematician and physicist Josiah Willard Gibbs, who considered mathematics as a language. Mathematics in its many fields is probably identical to those visual languages which, to the initiated, can give an experience similar to that evoked by poets who are creative in the use of words and their condensation to thoughts.
In my experience, both art and science originate from one source, i.e. human life, the origin from which springs the mysterious act of thinking anew. The beauty emanating from this source can well be inherent in a scientific conception or in the design of a scientific experiment, as it is in a work of art. The numerous designs, as formed by man of all times and cultures in endless varieties in the plastic and other arts, spring from this source. It resides also where human thought is most at home and where, in our time, it appears to be overlooked, neglected or ignored, namely, in philosophy. May 1969) . There he will find that I am well aware of the limitations of my 'Arp-Brancusi kind of sculpture' as a terminal achievement of computer art. He will also note that QUAD III, the work to which he evidently alludes, is not a 'programmed, lathe-turned' sculpture (on the contrary, the actual situation is 'worse' -it was made by hand from computer provided patterns). Nor is the work a product of 'batch processing'. In batch processing, once the data cards have been fed into the machine, there is little or no interaction between the user and the machine. But computer graphics, unlike batch processing, encourages this kind of man-machine interaction. Using TRAN 2 (the name of our program) the sculptor 'converses' with the IBM 1130 computer via the typewriter. For instance, if the sculptor makes a mistake, the computer gives him a chance to rectify it.
My article in Artforum was very explicit in stating that sculptors will eventually be doing a lot more with the computer than using it to assist in the design of volumetric abstract sculpture, which is just a beginning. Computer art will assume many diverse forms. Among them will be kinetic and cinematic forms, probably by means of a 3-D projection system based on holographic principles (the computer serving as one source of the interference patterns that generate the holographic image). The system will simulate a real-life effect with virtually a 95 per cent verisimilitude and will conjure theoretical and imaginary 'realities' as well. Actual objects and events will not be required because they will seem to be present in a highly convincing way. In fact, among my current projects I am projecting what might be called auto-referential images of sculpture onto rotating sculpture with the idea of suggesting some of the visual/spatial qualities I expect from this medium of the future.
I will end with the following definitions taken from the USA Standard Vocabulary for Information Processing-October, 1968:
Software -A set of computer programs, procedures, rules and possibly associated documentation concerned with the operation of a data processing system, e.g. 3, 256 (1970) ). The devices he cites as examples of 'electronic software', namely radio, telephone etc. are mostly what we would call 'terminal devices' and are in themselves strictly composed of hardware. But perhaps he means the 'concept or science of radio communication' and not 'radios' themselves. If so, he is still at odds with current usage in the computing field. Neither can I accept completely the definition of software submitted by Mallary in his letter above; although it is much closer to what I mean by the term. Burnham is completely right in saying that the meaning of the word software is in a state of flux. I, myself, would be prepared to defend the following remarks in front of both artists and the computer science fraternity.
Suppose the engineers at the XYZ computer company have put together a piece of hardware which they call 'Machine A'. After some consideration, the sales department decides that 'Machine A' will never sell because it is too difficult to program. If the engineers had only designed a somewhat different machine, call it B, sales would be immense because B is easy to program, very versatile and can be learned in only 3 hours of instruction. 'But', say the engineers, 'to make "Machine B" would cost at least twice as much as A and it wouldn't be reliable'. So the company hires some programmers and tells them to write a program that will make 'Machine A' behave as if it really were ' Machine B'. This program will 'live' inside 'Machine A' and the casual user will never know the difference between A with this program and a genuine 'Machine B'. The generic term for such program is software. (User programs are generally excluded from this category.)
As far as I can see, the distinction between hardware ('Machine A') and software (the program that makes A behave like B) has not been taken into account either by Mallary or Burnham. Furthermore, the question which supports the othersoftware or hardware-is rather silly. Neither is useful without the other.
I would also like to challenge Mallary's etymology of the word software. I thought (I have no evidence) that it was derived in contrast to hardware because the hardware was difficult to change whereas the software was (supposedly) more malleable.
An interesting property of software, mentioned neither by Mallary or Burnham, is that it is not 'conservative' in the sense that energy or mass is. It is like a photograph of the surface of the Moon. The first copy costs a great deal to obtain, whereas the second and subsequent copies cost very little. As regards to whether the 'art' was produced by computer with or without the intervention of human hands, whether the computer actually cut a paper tape that drove an automatic milling machine or whether lack of funds curtailed complete automation and the job was finished by hand, is only a matter of technique. Some artists paint standing, some sitting and one, I have been told, lying on his back. I venture to suggest that to the spectator, at least, it is not the road the artist took but rather where he got to that counts.
Caxton Books 3, 235 (1970) ) was a serious appraisal and, as the editor, I am pleased to acknowledge this. However, the review is marred by a few factual errors that I feel it is my duty to correct.
First, I must point out that the title DATA stands for Directions in Art, Theory and Aesthetics (and not Developments).
Secondly, Nine Abstract Artists contained an introduction by Lawrence Alloway and not a collection of nine essays by Alloway, as is implied by Frampton. The essays in this publication were by the nine artists themselves.
My remaining comments have to do with Frampton's remarks concerning my own contribution to DATA. When he writes 'Hill asks rather inconclusively how is one to measure the degree of asymmetry of an asymmetric graph' readers will, I hope, realize that my question was directed to Rashevsky who, in his writings, seems to have overlooked the fact that this topic has been adequately dealt with.
Finally, Frampton's gloss on my method for computing the topological information content of a Mondrian (restricted to the linear 'infra-structure') is so hasty as to be quite meaningless.
Anthony Books 3, 247 (1970) ) I would like to make the following comments. Jan Nemeth suggests an alternative title, 'Perception of Graphic Space', as a more precise one. Perhaps so. This was coincidently an early choice of mine. It was changed later in order to place more emphasis on learning to perceive graphically (graphic perception). For this purpose the reader-viewer is asked to make spatial judgements from illustrations especially done for the book.
Why were certain examples using perspective omitted? I felt that there were already several excellent books on this subject and did not wish to involve the reader in the somewhat complicated mechanics of formal perspective.
Why was there no use of simultaneous perspective (cubism)? Perhaps some cubist qualities may be found in my examples of Transparency, Overlap and Value. Also omitted were examples of Op art, where entire surfaces are spatially modulated. Color as a spatial factor was omitted due to printing costs.
As indicated in my preface, the book was not meant to be a complete handbook of spatial effects. It was to act as a seed from which roots could reach out into various visual endeavors.
Frank 
